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Abstract
The recent experience with low inﬂation, and the experience of several economies
has reopened interest in the liquidity trap; which occurs when the nominal interest
rate reaches its zero lower bound. To reduce the real interest rate, and to stimulate
the economy, the modern literature highlights the role of high inﬂationary expecta-
tions. Using the Dixit-Lambertini (2003) framework of strategic policy interaction,
we ﬁnd that the optimal institutional response to the possibility of a liquidity trap has
two main components. First, an optimal inﬂation target given to the Central Bank.
Second, the Treasury, who retains control over ﬁscal policy and acts as leader, is given
optimal output and inﬂation targets. This keeps inﬂationary expectations suﬃciently
high and achieves the optimal rational expectations pre-commitment solution. Sim-
ulations show that this arrangement is (1) optimal even when the Treasury has no
inﬂation target but follow’s the optimal output target and (2) ‘near optimal’ even
when the Treasury follows its own agenda through a suboptimal output target but is
willing to follow an optimal inﬂation target. Finally, if monetary policy is delegated
to an independent central bank with an optimal inﬂation target, but the Treasury
retains discretion over ﬁscal policy, then the outcome can be a very poor one.
Keywords: liquidity trap, strategic monetary-ﬁscal interaction, optimal Taylor
rules.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E63, E52, E58, E61.1. Introduction
In its classical form, the liquidity trap, a term coined by Keynes (1936), is a situation where
an economy is caught up in a deﬂation and the nominal interest rate has been driven down
to zero (the so called ‘zero bound’). The source of a liquidity trap, in most circumstances,
is a sharp fall in aggregate demand; see Keynes (1936), Bernanke (2003). Interest in the
liquidity trap has revived in recent years due, in no small measure, to the experience of
Japan since 1990 but also due to the recent experience of Germany and France. The era of
low, and successful, inﬂation targets in several parts of the world1 opens up the possibility
that suﬃciently large negative demand shocks might push an economy into a liquidity trap
with huge associated welfare consequences2.
Traditional monetary policy looses its eﬀectiveness because nominal interest rates can
be reduced no further in order to boost the interest sensitive components of aggregate
demand. Hence, reliance must be placed on other, possibly more expensive, policies.
Keynes (1936), in the ﬁrst policy prescription for a liquidity trap, suggested the use of
ﬁscal policy, which works through the multiplier eﬀect to boost output and employment.
However, the recent literature has largely focussed on monetary policy and the role of
expectations. Krugman (1998, 1999) reformulated the liquidity trap as a situation where
an economy requires a negative real interest rate. With nominal interest rates bound
below by zero, the only way in which a negative real interest rate can be achieved is to
have an expectation of positive inﬂation3. This, in turn, creates a need for a credible
commitment to the future level of actual inﬂation because after the economy has escaped
from the liquidity trap it is in the interest of all parties to reduce inﬂation. A forward
looking private sector will anticipate this and expect low future inﬂation. But then the
real interest rate remains positive, keeping the economy in a liquidity trap.
The subsequent literature on the liquidity trap has also considered exchange rate poli-
cies such as currency depreciation, integral stabilization, a carry tax on currency, open
market operations in long term bonds, price level targets, and money growth rate pegs.
The surveys in Svensson (2003) and Blinder (2000) consider these policies in detail, how-
1Average inﬂation rates in successive decades from the 1950’s on to the current decade show a declining
trend; see Table 1 in Svensson (2003).
2High unemployment is an obvious fallout of a liquidity trap. An increase in the real value of private
debt has further adverse consequences particularly for the ﬁnancial sector. An increase in the real public
debt creates a diﬃcult problem for the government to increase taxes to balance its books on the one hand
but risk getting mired deeper into a recession on the other.
3The real interest rate is given by r = i − πe where i is the nominal interest rate and πe is expected
inﬂation. In a liquidity trap, i =0and typically πe < 0, hence r>0. To expand economic activity, the
government needs to lower r; one possible solution is to generate positive inﬂationary expectations.
1ever, these policies have important limitations4,5.
1.1. The Japanese experience: ﬁscal policy
The Japanese experience with the liquidity trap since the 1990’s is now well documented;
for instance, Posen (1998). Here we emphasize three points6.
J1 Potency of ﬁscal policy in a liquidity trap: The large budget deﬁcits in Japan over the
1990’s, which reached a peak of about 140 percent of GDP have sometimes formed the
basis for the conclusion that Japanese ﬁscal policy was not eﬀective in the liquidity
trap. However, this view is at variance with the empirical evidence; for instance
Posen (1998), Kuttner and Posen (2001), Iwamura et al. (2005) and Ball (2005).
Kuttner and Posen show that tax revenues fell through the deﬂation of the 1990’s.
Worried by the special demographic problems faced by Japan, the budget deﬁcits
largely funded existing expenditure commitments. It follows that the stabilization
component of Japanese ﬁscal policy in the 1990’s was quite weak. Kuttner and Posen
show that when the ﬁscal stimulus was strong, such as in the ﬁscal package of 1995,
it worked in stimulating GDP. On the whole, however, expansionary ﬁscal policies
were largely oﬀset by other contractionary components of ﬁscal policy such as an
increase in the national consumption tax from 3 percent to 5 percent, increase in
the contribution rates to social security and the repeal of temporary tax cuts. It
is useful to cite more fully from Posen (1998). He writes “The reality of Japanese
ﬁscal policy in the 1990’s is less mysterious and ultimately, more disappointing. The
actual amount injected into the economy by the Japanese government- through either
4Variants of the devaluation approach can be found in McCallum (2000) and Svensson (2003). There are
several potential problems with the devaluation option. First, calibrated models show that the magnitude
of the devaluation required to get out of the liquidity trap might be too high. Second, using the uncovered
interest rate parity condition when the domestic interest rate is zero, the expected appreciation of the home
currency is fully locked-in by the foreign interest rate. Third, current devaluation will generate expectations
of future appreciation of currency when the economy moves out of the liquidity trap, generating counter
ﬂows that frustrate attempts to devalue. Fourth, devaluations may bring about competitive devaluations
or retaliations in the form of other barriers to trade.
5In a liquidity trap, zero nominal interest rates make bonds and money perfect substitutes. Hence, it
might be diﬃcult to engineer a price level increase. Furthermore, increases in money supply, suggested,
for instance, in Clouse et al. (2003) and in Orphanides and Wieland (2000), for a long enough period
that exceeds the duration of the liquidity trap, creates problems of credibility. While short term interest
rates might be zero, long term interest rates might be strictly positive (this has been true of Japan during
its deﬂationary experience). Hence, several authors such as Bernanke (2002) and Auerbach and Obstfeld
(2005) have suggested open market operations in long term bonds. However, moving the long run yield
curve on securities is confounded by the presence of the risk premium term whose behavior in a liquidity
trap is not well known. A carry tax on money, suggested by Buiter and Panigirtzoglu (2003), works in
theory but substantial practical problems of implementation are likely.
6There are clearly other relevant issues in the Japanese experience such as the ineﬀectiveness of mon-
etary policy that we do not touch on here; see Blinder (2000).
2public spending or tax reductions- was about a third of the total amount announced.
This limited quantity of total ﬁscal stimulus was disbursed in ineﬃciently sized and
ineﬃciently administered doses with the exception of the 1995 stimulus package.
The package did result in solid growth in 1996, demonstrating that ﬁscal policy does
work when it is tried....On net, the Japanese ﬁscal stance in the 1990’s was barely
expansionary." The empirical results of Iwamura et. al (2005) and Ball (2005) lend
strong support to the ﬁnding of Kuttner and Posen.
J2 Lack of appropriate institutions and incentives for policy makers: The inability of
the Japanese Treasury to follow through with an appropriate ﬁscal stimulus suggests
the possibility of inadequate institutional foundations to deal with the liquidity trap.
For instance, the Japanese ﬁscal and monetary authorities did not have any explicit
output/ inﬂation targets prior to the onset of the liquidity trap that (1) might have
created incentives for an appropriate response, and (2) altered expectations, partic-
ularly inﬂationary expectations, that could have dampened the liquidity trap.
J3 Lack of coordination between the ﬁscal and monetary authorities: Competing policy
authorities might disagree on the appropriate response to a liquidity trap, possibly
worsening the situation. For instance, the empirical results of Iwamura et. al (2005)
indicate lack of coordination between the monetary and ﬁscal policy authorities.
They write “It also suggests that policy coordination between the government and the
Bank of Japan did not work well during this period, in the sense that the government
deviated from the Ricardian rule towards ﬁscal tightening while the BOJ (Bank of
Japan) adopted a zero interest rate policy and quantitative easing.”
1.2. About our paper
To motivate our paper we ask the following three questions.
Q1 Is there strategic policy interaction between the various policy makers?
Models of strategic monetary and ﬁscal policy interaction have recently been given
a new impetus by the work of Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Lambertini and
Rovelli (2003) (which, however, do not consider a liquidity trap). Issues of strategic
interaction between policy makers assume even greater signiﬁcance during times of
extreme recessions as the Japanese experience (J3 above) indicates. However, issues
of strategic policy interaction between monetary and ﬁscal authorities are completely
ignored by the theoretical work on the liquidity trap. Typically the only policy
considered is monetary policy and so issues of strategic interaction do not arise7.O n
7Examples are Krugman (1998), Eggerston and Woodford (2003), Shin-Ichi (2003), Clouse et al. (2003),
Buiter- Panigirtzoglou (2003), and Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005). Ball (2005) considers ﬁscal policy alone.
3the other hand, when multiple policies are considered, their strategic interaction is
not considered8.
Q2 Can liquidity traps occur in equilibrium?
One strand of the literature considers policies that could mitigate the eﬀects of
liquidity traps. The other strand prescribes policies that would prevent the economy
from ever falling into a liquidity trap9. In general, the optimal policy for our model
allows the economy to fall into a liquidity trap with some probability. Thus our model
is in the economics tradition that stresses limiting economic bads (e.g. externalities)
to their ‘optimal level’, rather than complete elimination10.
Q3 Is the perspective ex-ante or ex-post?
The literature typically asks either one of the following two questions. (1) What
is the optimal institutional design (assignments of targets and instruments to the
various policy makers) when there is the possibility of a liquidity trap in the future?
(2) Given that the economy is in a liquidity trap, what actions can be taken to
eliminate the liquidity trap11. There is considerable disagreement on both questions,
particularly the latter. An ex-ante perspective allows one to plan optimally for a
problem before it arises, while an ex-post approach is mainly concerned with damage
control. Furthermore, the announcements of policy makers during a liquidity trap
(an ex-post perspective) might carry little credibility for the public. Hence, ideally
one would like to look at the appropriate institutional design prior to the onset of a
liquidity trap (an ex-ante perspective).
We describe our paper as follows. We would answer yes to the ﬁrst two questions
and ‘ex-ante perspective’ to the third. More fully we consider strategic monetary-ﬁscal
interaction in a simple aggregate supply - aggregate demand model similar to the one in
8Examples include (1) monetary and ﬁscal policy in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002), Iwa-
mura et al. (2005) and (2) monetary and exchange rate policy in Orphanides and Wieland (2000),
McCallum (2000) and Svensson (2003). Bernanke (2002) considers both monetary and ﬁscal policy but
there is no theoretical analysis.
9In the ﬁrst group are Krugman (1998), Eggerston and Woodford (2003), Orphanides and Wieland
(2000), McCallum (2000), and Svensson (2003). In the second group are Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2002), Shin-Ichi (2003), Clouse et al. (2003), Buiter- Panigirtzoglou (2003), and Auerbach and
Obstfeld (2005).
10A dental analogy might be appropriate here. Tooth decay can be prevented by extracting all the
child’s teeth. But, normally, the optimal policy is not to extract; tooth decay then occurs with some
probability.
11In the ﬁrst group are Krugman (1998), Eggerston and Woodford (2003), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2002), Shin-Ichi (2003), Clouse et al. (2003), Buiter- Panigirtzoglou (2003). In the second group
are papers by Ball (2005), Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005). Finally there are papers that touch on both
ex-ante and ex-post issues, for instance, Orphanides and Wieland (2000), McCallum (2000), Bernanke
(2002), Svensson (2003).
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Figure 1.1: Relation of our paper with the previous literature
5Dixit and Lambertini (2003) but extended to allow for a liquidity trap and the eﬀect of
inﬂationary expectations in the aggregate supply curve. There is some possibility that the
economy will fall into a liquidity trap in some state of the world in the future. Our central
concern is to identify optimal institutional arrangements12 from an ex-ante perspective.
Figure 1.1 summarizes our paper in relation to the existing literature.
1.3. Some results and intuition
As pointed out above, Krugman identiﬁed the solution to a liquidity trap as creating high
enough inﬂationary expectations. However, under discretion, promises of high inﬂation
will not be believed. This is because outside a liquidity trap the correct value for the real
interest rate can be achieved more cheaply with zero inﬂation. Therefore, if the economy
turns out not to be liquidity trapped, the Treasury has an incentive to renege on its promise
of high inﬂation. A rational forward looking private sector will anticipate this. The result
is low inﬂation expectations, keeping the real interest rate too high in a liquidity trap.
Notice that unlike the standard analysis conducted in the absence of a liquidity trap the
discretionary outcome can be suboptimal relative to the precommitment outcome because
it creates too little inﬂation.
We suggest an institutional solution, the optimal delegation regime,t h a ta c h i e v e st h e
optimal rational expectations precommitment solution for all parameter values in our
model. The optimal delegation regime seems broadly in line with the successful arrange-
ments introduced by the British Chancellor Gordon Brown in 1997 and seems entirely
natural. This regime has three components. First, the Treasury acts as Stackelberg leader
and the Central Bank as follower. Second, an inﬂation target is given to a Central Bank
who has exclusive control over monetary policy. Outside a liquidity trap, where monetary
policy is eﬀective, the Treasury would rather not use the relatively more costly ﬁscal sta-
bilization policy, leaving the Central Bank to perform the stabilization function. Because
the Central Bank is operationally independent and it’s sole objective is achieving monetary
stability, this type of delegation provides a commitment to the necessary inﬂation level
when the economy is not in a liquidity trap. Our third component is to give the Treasury,
who retains control of ﬁscal policy, something like a Taylor rule, which penalizes deviations
of output from an output target and inﬂation from the inﬂation target. This gives the
Treasury the correct incentive to undertake the appropriate (but costly) ﬁscal stimulus in
a liquidity trap where monetary policy is ineﬀective. Consequently, inﬂation expectations
are at the right level to produce the correct value for the real interest rate in a liquidity
trap. For a variety of reasons e.g. electoral concerns, the output target of the Treasury
12By optimality or near optimality we mean regimes that help us to attain or get very close to the
optimal rational expectations (or pre-commitment) solution.
6may diﬀer from the optimal target. In this case, we ﬁnd that even if the Treasury’s output
target is substantially diﬀerent from the optimal output target, this suboptimal delegation
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Figure 1.2: Outcomes under various regimes
While it may appear reasonable to assign an inﬂation target to the Central Bank, it
may be asked why should the Treasury have an inﬂation target, as well as an output
target? It turns out that so long as the Treasury follows the optimal output target, then
the delegation regime achieves the optimal solution even if the Treasury does not have an
inﬂation target (and even if the Treasury does not care about the costs of ﬁscal policy).
However, in this case, the delegation regime is not robust; in the sense that if the output
target of the Treasury is diﬀerent from the optimal target, then performance is poor and
can be much worse than under discretion. Hence, giving the Treasury an inﬂation target
(as well as an output target), while not essential for optimality, adds to the robustness
of the policy. In particular the hybrid regime where monetary policy is delegated to an
independent central bank with an optimal inﬂation target, while the Treasury retains
discretion over ﬁscal policy, can perform badly and much worse than had the Treasury
retained discretion over both monetary and ﬁscal policy. We summarize these results in
Figure 1.2. In each regime the central bank follows its optimally assigned inﬂation target.
Furthermore, the optimal delegation regime achieves the optimal mix between mone-
tary and ﬁscal policy as we now explain. Theoretically, society could give a suﬃciently
high inﬂation target to the Central Bank which in turn generates suﬃciently high inﬂation
expectations so that the nominal interest rate never hits its zero ﬂoor. While this policy
would always avoid the liquidity trap, it is not optimal because inﬂation is costly. Analo-
gously it is not optimal to give the Treasury too high an output target because if a liquidity
trap occurs, it would use the costly ﬁscal policy excessively. The optimal solution then is
7to have a mix of both i.e. some inﬂation outside a liquidity trap and some dependence on
costly ﬁscal policy in a liquidity trap.
The ﬁrst best is achieved if one could remove the distortions that cause the liquidity
trap. The second best obtains with the optimal rational expectations commitment solution.
The third best is achieved with various institutional design features introduced into policy
making. The fourth best obtains under discretion. It is well known that, in the absence
of a liquidity trap, ‘optimal institution design’, such as Walsh contracts, can achieve the
second best. Our suggested institutional design achieves the second best in the presence
of a liquidity trap.
1.4. Schematic outline
The model is formulated in Section 2. Section 3 derives the two benchmark solutions:
the optimal rational expectations precommitment solution and the discretionary solution.
Section 4 derives the optimal delegation solution. Section 5 demonstrates the robustness
of the model by allowing for the full set of parameters, persistence of demand shocks and
several alternative formulations of the Treasury’s objectives. Section 6 concludes with a
brief summary. Proofs are relegated to appendices.
2. Model
In this section we describe the most parsimonious version of the model. In Section 5
below, we demonstrate the robustness of the results of this model with respect to the full
set of parameters, persistent demand shocks, a general probability distribution over the
two states of nature, and further considerations about the Treasury’s objectives.
2.1. Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply
We use an aggregate demand and supply framework that is similar to Ball (2005), Dixit
and Lambertini (2003) and Lambertini and Rovelli (2003). The aggregate demand and
supply equations are given by, respectively
AD : y = f − (i − π
e)+  (2.1)
AS : y = π − π
e (2.2)
where y is the deviation of output from the natural rate and f captures ﬁscal policy.
For example, f>0 could denote a ﬁscal deﬁcit (either debt ﬁnanced or money ﬁnanced13)
13In principal these alternative modes of ﬁnance need not be equivalent. However, in the context of
8while f<0,aﬁscal surplus. But f could also denote a temporary balanced budget
reallocation of taxes and subsidies that has a net expansionary eﬀect; for instance Dixit
and Lambertini (2000). i ≥ 0 is the nominal interest rate, π is the rate of inﬂation, πe
is expected inﬂation14 and   is a demand shock15. The instruments of policy are i and f.
The demand shock   takes two values, a,−a, with equal probability, where a>0,h e n c e
E [ ]=0 , Va r[ ]=a
2. (2.3)
The aggregate demand equation reﬂects the fact that demand is increasing in the ﬁscal
impulse, f, and decreasing in the real interest rate; it is also aﬀe c t e db yd e m a n ds h o c k s .
The aggregate supply equation shows that deviations of output from the natural rate are
caused by unexpected movements in the rate of inﬂation. Note the absence of parameters
in (2.1),(2.2). This is because our conclusions do not qualitatively depend on the values
of such parameters (see Section 5). So we have suppressed them to improve readability.
Equating aggregate demand and supply we get from (2.1) and (2.2), our reduced form
equations for output and inﬂation.
y = f − i + π
e +   (2.4)
π = f − i +2 π
e +   (2.5)
Hence, ﬁscal policy, monetary policy and inﬂation expectations (in the spirit of New Key-
nesian models) have an aﬀect on output (and so also on unemployment) and inﬂation.
2.2. Microfoundations
Our model is inspired by the microfounded dynamic model of monopolistic competition
and staggered price setting in Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2003). Our structural model
in (2.1),(2.2) (or its variant with the full set of parameters given in (5.1), (5.2) below) is
a liquidity trap, Ball (2005) shows that there are no long run diﬀerences arising from these alternative
modes of ﬁnance.
14The following formulation might appear even more plausible






AS : yt = πt − πe
t
where πe
t = Et−1πt and πe
t+1 = Etπt+1. However, in our model, the private sector has to make its decision
before the realization of the demand shock  t. Hence, in the aggregate demand curve, it has to forecast
πe
t+1 at time t − 1.B u tEt−1πe
t+1 = Et−1 (Etπt+1)=Et−1 (πt+1)=Et−1 (πt)=πe
t
15The modern literature on the liquidity trap stresses demand shocks as major contributory factors. We
could also consider supply shocks. The main diﬀerence is as follows. A suﬃciently negative demand shock
will push the economy into a liquidity trap. On the other hand, a suﬃciently positive supply shock will
also create a liquidity trap. In either case, the real interest rate fails to drop suﬃciently to match demand
with supply. Hence our framework can be easily extended to incorporate supply, as well as demand,
shocks.
9similar to Dixit and Lambertini16. In the Dixit and Lambertini framework, unexpected
movements in inﬂation have real eﬀects because prices are staggered. A similar New-
Keynesian justiﬁcation might explain the presence of the unexpected inﬂation term in
(2.5).
2.3. Notation
We shall write a variable with a subscript (sometimes a superscript) ‘+’, for example,
y+, to denote the realization of that variable in the (good) state of the world,   = a.
Analogously, to denote the realization of the same variable in the (bad) state of the world,
  = −a, we use a subscript (sometimes a superscript) ‘−’, for example, y−.
2.4. Social Preferences











The ﬁrst term shows that departures of output from its desired level, yS (note that yS
is the diﬀerence between desired output and the natural rate), are costly. We assume that
yS ≥ 0 (2.7)
This captures the fact that the natural level of output is socially suboptimal17.
The second term in (2.6) indicates that inﬂation reduces social welfare. The third term
captures the fact that the exercise of ﬁscal policy is more costly than that of monetary
policy18. We model this as imposing a strictly positive cost of ﬁscal policy, f2, but no cost
16However, our model has the following diﬀerences from Dixit-Lambertini. (1) We normalize the natural
rate of output to zero, hence, the additive shock   (in (2.1) or in (2.4)) can also be interpreted as a shock
to the natural rate of output. (2) Our model has the New Keynesian feature that expected inﬂation, πe,
also aﬀects actual inﬂation, π. (3) Our stochastic structure allows persistence (see section 5 below). While
there is no persistence in Dixit-Lambertini, they allow all parameters to be stochastic, hence, considering
the possibility of non-additive shocks. (4) In our model a ﬁscal impulse acts on the demand side, creating
greater output and inﬂation. However, in Dixit-Lambertini ﬁscal policy works on the supply side and
takes the form of a subsidy to imperfectly competitive ﬁrms that increases output but reduces prices.
17The microfoundations for this in our model rest as in Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2003) on the
presence of monopolistic competition. Monopoly power in the product market reduces output below the
eﬃcient level, hence, giving policy makers an incentive to raise output. There are also a large number
of other well known reasons for (2.7) but the ultimate cause, argue Alesina and Tabellini (1987), is the
absence of non-distortionary taxes. For if they were available then other market failures could be corrected.
18Fiscal policy is typically more cumbersome to alter, on account of the cost of changing it (balanced
budget requirements, lobby groups etc.). Indeed the ‘monetary policy committee’ in the UK or the Fed
in the USA meet on a regular basis to make decisions on the interest rate while changes to the tax rates
are much less frequent.
10of using the monetary policy19. The cost of using ﬁscal policy could include deadweight
losses, as in Dixit and Lambertini (2003), costs of servicing debt and a risk premium for
default. For expositional clarity we omit parameters in (2.6), but see Section 5. On the
microfoundations of such a social welfare function , see Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2003),
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
2.4.1. Treasury and Social Preferences
We will assume for now that society can, if it desires, delegate policy to a “Treasury” that
fully internalizes its objective function given in (2.6). So we will use society and Treasury
interchangeably here. Other assumptions are considered in Section 5 below.
2.5. Sequence of Moves
At the ﬁrst stage the economy designs its institutions, which assign powers of policy-making
decisions to one or two independent policy makers. This is followed by the formation of
inﬂationary expectations, πe, and the signing of nominal wage contracts in anticipation
of future inﬂation. Next, the demand shock,  , is realized. In light of the actual real-
ization of the shock, the relevant policy makers then decide on the optimal values of the
policy variables, f and i. We shall also derive the optimal rational expectations solution
(precommitment benchmark) in which the last stage is conducted up-front i.e. the (state
contingent) policy variables f and i are announced to the economy prior to the resolution
of demand uncertainty.
3. The Precommitment and Discretionary Solutions
3.1. The Precommitment Regime (The optimal rational expectations solution)
In this section we calculate the globally optimal solution in the class of all rational ex-
pectations solutions20. The global optimality of the precommitment solution serves as a
useful benchmark. The sequence of moves is described below.
T h es o l u t i o nm e t h o di st oﬁnd state contingent rules for the policy variables, i( ), f( ),
i.e., (i−,f −), (i+,f +), that maximize the expected value of the social welfare (2.6) under
the constraints (2.4), (2.5) and the rational expectations condition πe = E [π], i.e.
19Strictly speaking, for our qualitative results to hold, we only require that ﬁscal policy be relatively
more expensive than the (possibly strictly positive) cost of using monetary policy. Normalizing the cost
of using monetary policy to zero, however, ensures greater tractability and transparency of the results.
20Strictly speaking, this is a second best solution. The ﬁrst best obtains if the imperfections responsible
for the liquidity trap are removed. It is variously referred to as the ‘precommitment solution’, the ‘optimal
rational expectations solution’, the ‘second best solution’ or simply the ‘optimal solution’.
11 
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The results are summarized in Proposition 1. Superscript ‘e’ denotes expected value.
Proposition 1 : The optimal state-contingent rational expectations precommitment so-
lution is given by
² = −a < 0 ² = a > 0 ²e= 0
i− =0 i+ = 6
5a ie = 3
5a
f− = 2
5a f+ =0 fe = 1
5a
y− = −1
5a y+ = 1
5a ye =0
π− = 1
5a π+ = 3
5a πe = 2
5a
i− − πe = −2
5a i+ − πe = 4
5a ie − πe = 1
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Opt =0when   = a. ¥




Opt < 0 when   = −a. Hence, the economy is
always liquidity trapped when   = −a. In this case, monetary policy is not eﬀective,
i− =0 . Hence, the government must commit to using expensive ﬁscal policy, f− = 4
3a,i n
order to ‘lean against the wind’. By contrast, when   = a,m o n e t a r yp o l i c yi se ﬀective,
i+ = 6
5a, and the government has no need for the expensive ﬁscal instrument, f+ =0 21.
Also note that output is below the natural rate (which is normalized to zero) in the
liquidity trap (  = −a)b u ta b o v ei to t h e r w i s e(   = a). On average, it equals the natural
rate (recall that y measures the deviation of output from the natural rate). Inﬂation is
21Recall that f refers only to the stabilization component of ﬁscal policy, hence, f+ =0is consistent
with a strictly positive level of government expenditure on other items such as redistribution etc.
12positive in both states of the world. The real interest rate is negative22 in the liquidity
trap but positive otherwise and on average.
Recalling that Va r[ ]=a2,o na v e r a g e ,C e t e r i sp a r i b u s ,i n ﬂation, interest rates and
the ﬁscal instrument of the government will display greater variability in economies where
demand shocks have a greater variance. Furthermore, the magnitude of policy instruments
employed in the two states of the world, f− = 2
5a and i+ = 6
5a, are increasing in the size
of the shock. This is not surprising as each of these policies fulﬁlls a stabilization role and
a larger shock elicits a greater eﬀort in “leaning against the wind”.
The solution is independent of yS, society’s desired output relative to the natural rate.
As in time consistency models in the absence of the liquidity trap, this occurs because, even
if society has a high yS, the precommitment technology allows it to counter expectations
of ex-post surprise inﬂation (designed to push output towards the high target).
The magnitude of social welfare in this regime depends negatively on the variance of
shocks hitting the economy, a2, and also on the output target of society, yS.
Finally, note that the values of i+, i−,f+,f− of the instruments are optimal ex-ante.
However, after the realization of the shock,   = −a or   = a,t h eex-post optimal values
of i, f will, in general, be diﬀerent from these. Thus, for successful implementation, this
optimal rational expectations solution needs a precommitment technology. We discuss this
in Section 4 below. Next we turn to the second regime in the paper: Discretion.
3.2. Discretionary Regime
In this case, the monetary instrument, i,a n dt h eﬁscal instrument, f, are both assigned
to the Treasury. We calculate the time consistent discretionary policy. The sequence of
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Figure 3.2: Sequence of moves when Treasury controls i, f.
To ﬁnd the discretionary solution, ﬁrst ﬁnd state-contingent values of the policy vari-
22We conjecture that the combination of rigid wages-prices and a ﬂexible nominal interest rate has the
eﬀect that the real interest rate, i − πe, overshoots so as to equilibrate the economy.
13ables i− (πe),f − (πe) and i+ (πe),f +(πe) that maximize social welfare (2.6) under the
constraints (2.1), (2.2) and conditional on given πe, . This allows the computation of the
state-contingent inﬂation rates π−(πe) and π+ (πe). Then one needs to ﬁnd the ﬁxed-point











Finally, substitute the value for πe back into the state-contingent policy variables
i− (πe),f − (πe) and i+(πe),f + (πe) to ﬁnd the solution under discretion.
Depending on the parameter values, a liquidity trap may or may not arise. Proposition
2 below summarizes the results when a liquidity trap, which is the focus of this paper,
arises23.
Proposition 2 :F o r1
2a ≤ yS <a , the economy is liquidity trapped for   = −a<0 but
not liquidity trapped for   = a>0. The solution under discretion is given by
² = −a < 0 ² = a > 0 ²e= 0
i− =0 i+ =4 yS − 2a ie =2 yS − a
f− =2( a − yS) > 0 f+ =0 fe =( a − yS) > 0
y− = yS − a<0 y+ = a − yS > 0 ye =0
π− =4 yS − 3a π+ =2 yS − a πe =3 yS − 2a
i− − πe =2 a − 3yS i+ − πe = yS > 0 ie − πe = a − yS > 0





=1 2 ayS − 8y2
S − 5a2.
For stabilization purposes, the costly ﬁscal policy is used only in a liquidity trap when
the monetary policy looses eﬀectiveness. As in the precommitment solution, deviations
of output from the natural rate are zero on average i.e. ye =0 . The following corollary
compares expected social welfare under Precommitment with that under Discretion.
Corollary 1 :F o r1












10 (5yS − 4a)
2 ≥ 0.
As one would expect, the presence of a liquidity trap does not alter the ranking between
the Precommitment and the Discretion regimes, from a social welfare point of view.
3.3. Alice through the looking glass
Krugman (1998) observed that ‘applying conventional modelling to liquidity trap con-
ditions produces unconventional conclusions and policy recommendations’. To which he
added (1999) ‘The whole subject of the liquidity trap has a sort of Alice-through-the-
looking-glass quality’. And indeed, our model exhibits these features, as we will now see.
23The full set of results under discretion is given in Appendix-B.
143.3.1. Precommitment can have higher inﬂa t i o nt h a nD i s c r e t i o n a r y
In the traditional time inconsistency literature, in the absence of a liquidity trap, the
optimal level of average inﬂation is zero (given the welfare function (2.6)) while under
discretion it is positive (unless yS =0 , in which case it is also zero); as is well known. The
reason is that under discretion, agents perceive (correctly) that the government has an
ex-post incentive to create surprise inﬂation, while under precommitment ex-post surprise
inﬂation is institutionally ruled out.
When a liquidity trap occurs with a positive probability this changes dramatically.
From Proposition 1 we see that the optimal level of average inﬂation under precommitment
now is positive (πe = 2a
5 ), rather than zero. Under discretion πe depends on yS.F o r
yS = 1
2a, Proposition 2 gives a negative average expected inﬂation rate (πe = −1
2a), rather
than a positive one.
The intuitive explanation is as follows. Under precommitment, it is optimal to have
positive inﬂation on average (πe = 2a
5 ) ,d e s p i t ei t sc o s t ,t ob ea b l et od e l i v e rn e g a t i v er e a l
interest rates (i− − πe = −2a
5 ) in the bad state of the world (  = −a). However, this
optimal policy is time inconsistent. If ex-post, the economy is in the good state (  = a)
then the optimal real interest rate is positive (i+ − πe = 4a
5 ) which can be achieved more
cheaply with zero inﬂation. Hence, the policy maker has the incentive to renege on its
commitment to positive inﬂation. The rational private sector will perceive this and expect
low future inﬂation. This destroys the credibility of the announcement of high inﬂation,
unless a commitment technology is available.
3.3.2. Higher output targets are a good thing
In the standard textbook model in the absence of a liquidity trap, a higher value of desired
output relative to the natural rate, yS > 0, is bad because it leads to high inﬂation and
no gain in output (ye =0 ). The reverse occurs with a liquidity trap, yS > 0 is now good!
The intuition is that a higher yS increases inﬂationary expectations (see Proposition 2)
which, by reducing the real interest rate in a liquidity trap, reduces the need for using the
expensive ﬁscal instrument.
If society has a high enough output target (and the Treasury follows it) then, in the
discretionary regime, ex-post, a liquidity trap will not arise. However, this outcome might
require using the costly ﬁscal instrument excessively, which could be suboptimal. In section
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Figure 4.1: Sequence of moves in the optimal delegation regime
4. Institutions and Delegation
In the delegation regime considered in this section, society gives the Central Bank the
mandate of achieving an inﬂation target πB. The monetary instrument, which is the
nominal interest rate, i, is assigned to the Central Bank whose objective is to attain the







The ﬁscal instrument, f, is controlled by the Treasury whose objective function is











where yT, πT are the output and inﬂation targets respectively of the Treasury24.
4.1. The Optimal Delegation Regime
Under optimal delegation, the game has ﬁve stages, shown in Figure 4.1.
The Treasury acts as Stackelberg leader and is given an output target, yT,a n da ni n ﬂation
target πT. In this subsection we consider the case πT = πB
25.T h e C e n t r a l B a n k i s t h e
24It is important to bear in mind the diﬀerence between the socially desirable output level, yS,a n d
the output target, yT, given to the Treasury. The optimal value, y∗
T,o fyT, i.e., the value of yT that
maximizes expected social welfare, might be very diﬀerent from yS. In fact, our simulations show that
y∗
T is well below yS.T h u saﬁscal authority should be ‘conservative’ in the sense that it should aim for a
lower output target than that desired by society. See, for example, Table 1, below.
25Note that in this subsection, the Treasury fully complies with the output/ inﬂation targets given to it
by society. Section 5, below, explores the possibility that the Treasury might not care for inﬂation and/
or be unwilling to follow the output target assigned by society because it has its own agenda.
16follower and is given an inﬂation target πB.T h eC e n t r a lB a n ks e t sm o n e t a r yp o l i c yt a k i n g
the ﬁscal policy, set by the Treasury, as given. The Treasury sets ﬁscal policy, taking
into account the anticipated response of the Central Bank. We solve the game backwards.
First we obtain the Central Bank’s reaction function i = i(πB,πe,f, ). Second, we ﬁnd
the Treasury’s reaction function f = f (yT,πB,πe, ). This allows us to derive output and
inﬂation as functions of yT,πB,πe, . Third, we determine πe, assuming rational expec-
tations on the part of the private sector. Fourth, we ﬁnd the expected social welfare as




Proposition 3 : Assume that monetary policy is delegated to an independent central
bank with inﬂation target π∗
B = 3
5a. Fiscal policy is retained by the Treasury with output
target y∗
T = 1
5a and acts as Stackelberg leader. Then the optimal rational expectations
(precommitment) solution (see Proposition 1) is achieved. Society’s expected utility in the








S. The economy is liquidity
trapped only under adverse demand shocks. Inﬂation and output targets are achieved in
the good state but not in the bad state.
So why does the optimal delegation regime perform so well? The inﬂation target given
to the Central Bank provides a commitment to the necessary inﬂation level when the
economy is not in a liquidity trap. This aﬀects the (ex-ante) inﬂation expectations which
also apply to the (ex-post) liquidity trap ensuring the correct value for the real interest rate
in a liquidity trap. Furthermore, inﬂationary expectations are also inﬂuenced correctly by
the output and inﬂation targets given to the Treasury that provide it with the incentive to
use the appropriate level of ﬁscal policy in a liquidity trap. Such an institutional regime
achieves the optimal balance between ﬁscal and monetary policy by neither having to rely
too much on costly inﬂation outside the liquidity trap nor relying too much on costly ﬁscal
policy in a liquidity trap.
4.2. Relation to the literature
The role of ﬁscal policy in theoretical models on the liquidity trap has not been ade-
quately stressed despite this being Keynes’s (1936) original solution to the problem. This
is puzzling in light of the empirical evidence from Posen (1998), Kuttner and Posen (2001)
which suggests that ﬁscal policy, when used in Japan, has been potent. The simulation
exercises of Ball (2005) show that ﬁscal transfers equal to 6.6 percent of GDP could have
ended Japan’s output slump. There have been other suggestions in the literature, without
a full theoretical model, that advocate ﬁscal policy in a liquidity trap. Bernanke (2002)
17recommends a broad based tax cut while Gertler (2003) recommends transitory ﬁscal pol-
icy. Our ﬁrst contribution is to consider ﬁscal policy explicitly in a Dixit and Lambertini
(2003) framework when there is the possibility of a liquidity trap.
The theoretical literature has considered aspects of our optimal delegation regime,t h a t
achieves the precommitment solution. For instance, inﬂation targets have been suggested
in Krugman (1998), Shin-Ichi (2003), and Iwamura et al. (2005) while other variants
of monetary policy commitment have also been considered. Benhabib Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2002) consider a commitment to switch from an interest rate rule to a money growth
rate peg in a liquidity trap. Eggerston and Woodford (2003) propose a commitment to
adjust nominal interest rates to achieve a time varying price level target. Bernanke (2002)
s u g g e s t sac o m m i t m e n tt oab u ﬀer zone for the inﬂation rate. Svensson (2003) advocates
a price level target (as part of a larger set of policies). However, none of these models
allow for the possibility of strategic monetary-ﬁscal policy interaction nor jointly derive
the optimal set of targets and instruments of the two policy making authorities. One of the
important lessons of our paper (see Figure 1.2 and Section 5 below) is that an optimally
derived target for one policy maker while ignoring the incentives and constraints facing the
other policy maker can lead to extremely poor outcomes; witness the last row in Figure
1.2. Our second contribution, therefore, is in explicitly considering strategic monetary-
ﬁscal interaction among independent policy authorities, and jointly deriving the optimal
targets and instruments of the two policy making authorities when there is the possibility
of a liquidity trap.
Furthermore, the optimal delegation regime achieves the optimal mix between mone-
tary and ﬁscal policy as we now explain. Theoretically, society could give a suﬃciently
high inﬂation target to the Central Bank which in turn generates suﬃciently high inﬂation
expectations so that the nominal interest rate never hits its zero ﬂoor. While this policy
would always avoid the liquidity trap, it is not optimal because inﬂation is costly. Analo-
gously it is not optimal to give the Treasury too high an output target because if a liquidity
trap occurs, it would use the costly ﬁscal policy excessively. The optimal solution then is
to have a mix of both i.e. some inﬂation outside a liquidity trap and some dependence on
costly ﬁscal policy in a liquidity trap.
The optimality of ﬁscal delegation to the Treasury in our paper is similar not only to
Dixit and Lambertini’s (2003) optimal regime of ‘Treasury leadership with commitment’
(derived in the absence of a liquidity trap), it is quite similar to the successful policy
arrangements introduced in Britain by the chancellor Gordon Brown. The intuition is
that if there were no liquidity trap, and the Treasury had its own agenda26, an issue
we consider more fully in Section 5 below, then it would undermine the Central Bank’s
26In Dixit and Lambertini (2003) the Treasury never has its own agenda and fully internalizes society’s
social welfare function.
18monetary commitment. However, appropriate delegation of policy to the Treasury, far from
undermining monetary commitment, gives it an incentive to engage in an ‘appropriate’
ﬁscal stimulus in a liquidity trap, where the independent Central Bank is ineﬀective.
Our model is not suited to analyzing issues of dynamics associated with government
debt. We nevertheless feel that out modelling choice is a fruitful one for the following
reasons. First, strategic interaction between monetary and ﬁscal policy can be analyzed
within dynamic structural models only under very severe restrictions. Second, in models
that incorporate dynamics of budget deﬁcits, for instance, Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005)
and Eggerston and Woodford (2003), there is no strategic interaction between policy mak-
ers. Furthermore, an important assumption of these models is that the government will
respect its intertemporal budget constraint at all times. While normally, this assumption
makes a great deal of sense and is consistent with the evidence, there is no guarantee that
during extraordinary times, such as during a liquidity trap, the government will honor its
intertemporal budget constraint. It might choose to default on its debt; an occurrence
not without precedent in the postwar history. On the other hand, the cost to ﬁscal policy
in our model may be viewed as including the cost of servicing debt and a risk-of-default
premium. Finally, the current generation of structural dynamic models in macroeconomics
are not without their problems27.
5. The general model
How are our results altered when we introduce the full set of parameters in the model
and allow for persistence in the demand shocks with a general probability distribution?
What if the Treasury has its own agenda, perhaps on account of electoral concerns or
other political economy considerations such as lobbying or interest groups? These issues
are considered in this Section. We demonstrate that the results of our model are robust
to the following ﬁve extensions.
E1. Introduction of the full set of parameters.
E2. Persistent demand shocks.
E3. General probability distribution over the two states of the world.
E4. The Treasury might not follow the socially optimal output target i.e. yT 6= y∗
T.
E5. The Treasury and the Central Bank can have distinct inﬂation targets i.e. πT 6= πB.
27Most dynamic structural models used in the analysis of a liquidity trap are forward looking New
Keynesian models. Gertler (2003), Mankiw (2002) note dissatisfaction with this model in terms of its
inability to explain persistence in the data. Recent work, for instance, Rudd and Whelan (2006), casts
doubt even on the hybrid variant proposed by Gali and Gertler (1999).
195.1. A note on output and inﬂation targets
5.1.1. Inﬂation Targets
There are two main cases. The inﬂation targets of the Treasury and Central Bank either
coincide (i.e. πT = πB), or diﬀer (i.e. πT 6= πB). In Section 4 we restricted attention to
the case πT = πB. However, in Subsection 5.5, both cases i.e. πT = πB and πT 6= πB are
considered. We show that the optimal delegation regime works equally well in each of these
two cases and achieves the optimal rational expectations precommitment solution. Whilst
this does not have implications for the optimality of our suggested delegation regime we
ﬁnd the case πT = πB more natural and easier to interpret. Furthermore, we show in
Subsection 5.8 that the optimal rational expectations solution can also be achieved if the
central bank alone has an inﬂation target while the Treasury simply follows the optimal
output target given to it by society.
5.1.2. Output Targets
The Treasury is an arm of the government. If the natural rate of output is socially sub-
optimal, say on account of monopolistic competition, then the government may have an
incentive to use ﬁscal instruments to increase output beyond its natural rate, at least tem-
porarily and a rational private sector will foresee this. The problem of assigning output
targets is compounded by the diﬃculty of measuring deviation of output from its natural
rate (compared with the lesser diﬃculty of measuring deviation of inﬂation from its target
value) and by the fact that output stability is only one (though important) consideration
for government and voters (by contrast, monetary stability can be made the sole objec-
tive of the central bank). Hence, it is important to consider the case where the Treasury
pursues its own agenda and sticks to its preferred value of the output target, yT,r a t h e r
than follow the optimal output target, y∗
T, that society assigns to it. Although in section
4 we restricted attention to the case yT = y∗
T, Section 5.5 below considers both cases i.e.
yT = y∗
T and yT 6= y∗
T.
We proceed as follows. First, we derive the optimal rational expectations precommit-
ment solution in this more general setting (Proposition 4). In general, this solution is
time-inconsistent and, therefore, requires a commitment technology. We then consider the
optimal delegation regime (ﬁrst considered in Section 4.1, above). If the Treasury follows
the optimal output target (i.e. yT = y∗
T), then the optimal delegation regime achieves the
precommitment solution for all values of the parameters (Proposition 5). If, however, the
Treasury cannot be given the optimal output target, and has its own agenda (i.e. yT 6= y∗
T),
then Section 5.7, below, shows that a ‘near optimal’ solution can still be achieved. What
if the Treasury is not given an inﬂation target or does not care about inﬂation at all, but
is willing to adopt the socially optimal output target? Section 5.8, below, shows that the
20optimal precommitment solution can still be achieved.
5.2. Description of the general model
The model is described by the following basic equations:
Aggregate Demand : y = ϕf − λ(i − π
e)+  (5.1)
Aggregate Supply : y = µ(π − π
e) (5.2)













The parameters α, β, γ, ϕ, λ, µ are all strictly positive. ϕ and λ are a measure of the
eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal and monetary policy respectively in inﬂuencing aggregate demand
and µ indicates the strength of inﬂation surprises in inﬂuencing aggregate supply. Finally,
α, β, γ are the relative weights given to the various terms in the objective function. The
state contingent values of the demand shock,  ,a r e :
Bad State:  − = ρx − (1 − p)s (5.4)
Good State:  + = ρx + ps (5.5)
where 0 <p<1, s>0 and 0 ≤ ρ<1.T h ev a r i a b l ex represents the previous period’s
shock and so ρ is a measure of the persistence in the shock. The second component in
(5.4), (5.5) shows the innovation terms. With probability p the shock takes the value  −
and with probability 1 − p it takes a value  +.H e n c eE [ ]=p − +( 1− p) + = ρx and so
in the absence of the persistence term, E [ ]=0as in the model presented in Section 2.
5.3. Sequence of moves
The sequence of moves under the regimes of precommitment, discretion and the optimal
delegation are as in Figures 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 respectively, except that in any period, the
realization of   depends on the value of the of the shock in the previous period, x.H e n c e ,
we have an explicitly dynamic game.
5.4. Optimal Solution
The optimal rational expectations precommitment solution, the analogue of Proposition
1, is described below in Proposition 4. The intuition behind the results is similar to that
behind Proposition 1 except that the magnitude of demand shocks in the past inﬂuence
the state of the economy in the current period and so one needs to distinguish between 3
cases. Our main focus is on Case (b) where the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad
state. The proof is derived analogously to that of Proposition 1 and, so, is omitted.
21Proposition 4 : (a) If x<−ps(α+βµ2)(αϕ2+γλ2)
αρ(γµ2+ϕ2(α+βµ2)) then the economy is liquidity trapped
in both states and the commitment solution is given by i− = i+ =0 ,
f− = ϕ
µ
(α + βµ2)s(1 − p)


















αρ(γµ2+ϕ2(α+βµ2)) ≤ x<(1 − p) s
ρ then the economy is liquidity trapped in the
bad state only and the commitment solution is given by i− = f+ =0 ,
f− =




















+ αγµ2 (1 − p)
¢ ≥ 0
(c) If x ≥ (1 − p) s
ρ then the economy is liquidity trapped in neither state and the com-
mitment solution is given by f− = f+ =0 ,
i− =






>i − ≥ 0
Proposition 4 illustrates the evolution of the economy over time. Suppose that the
economy is liquidity trapped in period t. How does it get out of a liquidity trap? Propo-
sition 4 (b), (c) gives the conditions required on how big the shocks must be in period t
so that in period t +1the economy is not liquidity trapped in at least in one state of the
world28.
5.5. The Optimal Delegation Regime
In this section we examine the possibility of achieving the optimal precommitment solution
through appropriate institutional design. Here we extend the optimal delegation framework
of Section 4.1 (details are suppressed to avoid repetition) to incorporate the ﬁve extensions















28This might not be a bad descriptor of the actual occurrence of a liquidity trap given the deep reser-
vations expressed about the eﬃcacy of most macroeconomic policies; see Blinder (2000) for an excellent
survey.
22Note that the parameters α, β, γ are the same as in society’s welfare function given in
(5.3). Denote the optimal inﬂation target of the Central Bank by π∗
B and the optimal
output and inﬂation targets of the Treasury by y∗
T and π∗
T respectively. Proposition 5,
below, states the results under optimal delegation. As in Proposition 4 the magnitude of
the demand shock in the previous period gives rise to three subcases, although we are
primarily interested in Case (b). The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3, so it is
omitted.
Proposition 5 : (a) Under the condition of Proposition 4(a), give the Central Bank any
inﬂation target, π∗








and give the Treasury





where k = α
(λ+µ)γρ(−x)
βµ(αϕ2+λ2γ). Then the solution under optimal delegation is the same as under
precommitment, and given by Proposition 4(a).










+ γµ2α(1 − p)
> 0 (5.8)









(α+βµ2)(αϕ2+γλ2p)+γµ2α(1−p). Then the solution under optimal delegation
is the same as under precommitment and is given by Proposition 4(b). Furthermore,
π+ = π∗
B.
(c) Under the condition of Proposition 4(c), give the Central Bank the inﬂation target
π∗
B =0 . Then, for any output and inﬂation target pair (yT,π T) for the Treasury, the solu-
tion under optimal delegation is the same as under commitment and is given by Proposition
4(c). Furthermore, π+ = π− = π∗
B =0 .
The intuition behind the optimality of this delegation regime is as in Section 4.1 above.
If the economy is not liquidity trapped in any state of the world we are in the standard
textbook case where delegation to an independent Central Bank achieves the precommit-
ment solution. Proposition 5(c) deals with this case. Our main case of interest, however,
is when the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state only; this is stated in Proposi-
tion 5(b). Here, the inﬂation target of the Central Bank is uniquely determined while the
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Figure 5.1: Output and inﬂation targets under the optimal and suboptimal
delegation regimes.
To explain the indeterminacy of yT and πT, note that the Treasury has two targets,
yT and πT, but just one instrument, f. Hence, the best it can hope for is hit just one
of these targets or, more generally, a linear combination of them. Maximizing society’s
expected welfare yields the optimal linear combination of yT and πT.T h i si sg i v e nb y( 5 . 7 )
in the case of Proposition 5(a) and (5.9) in the case of Proposition 5(b). The negative
slope signiﬁes that a high output bias is needed to compensate a low inﬂation target for
the Treasury.
What if the inﬂation targets of the Treasury and the Central Bank are identical?
Corollary 2 describes the results when the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state.
Corollary 2 : Under the conditions of Proposition 4(b), if πT = π∗
B,t h e nt h eo p t i m a l










+ γµ2α(1 − p)
> 0. (5.10)
and the Treasury attains this target in the good state i.e. y+ = y∗
T.
In Figure 5.1, the downward sloping line AA0 is a graph of yT (πT) deﬁned in (5.7) or
(5.9). The vertical line positioned at π∗
B reﬂects the inﬂation target for the central bank
given in 5.8. Ignore the downward sloping line BB0 for the moment.
24Proposition 5 then shows how the optimal delegation regime can achieve the optimal
precommitment solution in the following two cases,
1. The Treasury and the Central Bank can be given the same inﬂation target
Figure 5.1 shows that the optimal delegation solution is given by point C,w h e r e
πB = πT = π∗
B (given in (5.8)) and yT = y∗
T (given in (5.10)).
2. The Treasury and the Central Bank are given distinct inﬂation targets
Figure 5.1 shows one possible solution. The Central Bank is given the uniquely
determined inﬂation target i.e. πB = π∗
B (see (5.8)). The Treasury is given any





The results under discretion when we extend the basic model to extensions E1-E5 are
similar to those stated in Proposition 2. The full set of results are given in Appendix-
B; the method of proof is identical to that of Proposition 2, and is omitted. Denote by
EUDisc, the expected welfare level under discretion; we make use of it in Section 5.7 below.
5.7. Suboptimal Delegation: Treasury follows its own agenda (yT 6= y∗
T )
We now consider the case where the Treasury does not adopt the optimal output target
(see discussion in subsection 5.1.2 above); we call this regime ‘suboptimal delegation’. The
output target yT now represents the Treasury’s own agenda and it refuses to accept the
optimal output target, y∗
T. The objective function of the Treasury is given in (5.6). For
pedagogical simplicity, we stick here to the more natural case where the inﬂation targets
of the Treasury and the Central Bank are equal i.e. πB = πT.
Let π∗
B (yT) maximize society’s expected welfare, given the output target, yT,o ft h e
Treasury. For the general case in Section 5 the expression for yT (π∗
B) is too unwieldy, but












In Figure 5.1, the line BB0 is a sketch of (the inverse of) π∗
B (yT). Any point on the line
BB0 gives the optimal inﬂation target for the Central Bank, π∗
B (yT), conditional on the
Treasury’s private, but not necessarily optimal, output target, yT. which is steeper than
the schedule yT(πT) plotted as line AA0.
Suppose that the Treasury’s output target is given by yT = y1
T. Then, at one possible
suboptimal equilibrium πB = πT = π2
T while yT = y1
T i.e. the Treasury’s equilibrium
targets are shown by the point D.B e c a u s e p o i n t D is oﬀ the line AA, which plots the
25optimal menu of contracts for the Treasury, how well does the suboptimal delegation regime
fare, relative to the optimal precommitment solution? Simulations, below, show that the
performance of the suboptimal delegation regime is ‘near optimal’ and much better than
discretion.
Denote the expected social welfare level under suboptimal delegation by EUSD
S .T h e
state contingent values of the policy variables in this case run into several pages, so we
conﬁne ourselves to reporting a representative sample of simulation results. Towards this




S is the expected welfare level under the optimal solution relative to
the expected welfare under suboptimal delegation. Note that 0 <q≤ 1 and q =1when
yT = y∗
T (see Proposition 5).
ω = EUDisc
S /EUSD
S is the ratio of the expected welfare under discretion relative to that










is the ratio of the welfare loss under suboptimal delegation relative
to that under the optimal solution when each is expressed as a diﬀerence from the ex-
pected welfare level under discretion. Hence, relative to the discretionary solution as a
benchmark, this is the proportional loss to society in moving from the optimal solution to
the suboptimal delegation solution. Note that Q =1for yT = y∗
T (see Proposition 5).
o = yS/y∗
T is the output target of society relative to the optimal output target given to
the Treasury.
t = yT/y∗
T is the output target of the Treasury relative to the optimal output target
given to it.
The feasible set of parameters belongs to a ten dimensional set. We give below simu-
lations for a representative sample of parameters in Tables 1, 2 below. Tables 4 through
6 in Appendix-C give further simulation results to support our assertions. To simplify
results, we focus on cases where the output targets of the Treasury and society coincide
i.e. yT = yS (and so o = t)a n dt h ei n ﬂation targets of the Treasury and the Central Bank
also coincide i.e. πT = πB.
The main results of the simulations can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 6 : Even if the private agenda of the Treasury, i.e. yT, is substantially dif-
ferent from the optimal output target, y∗
T, the expected welfare level under the suboptimal
delegation solution is very close to the optimal precommitment solution i.e. q is very close
to 1. Suppose that we start with the minimal institutional framework of the discretionary
regime. Then moving to the institutional regime of suboptimal delegation recovers, for all
parameter values that we have investigated, a very large percentage of the beneﬁtt h a t
might accrue if one could move to the optimal solution i.e. Q is typically very close to 1.
26Table 1: p = 1
2,y T = yS = s,x =0

































































































10 0.9873 1.039 0.7521 2.84 0.371s
In Table 1, the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state only. Even if the output
target of the Treasury is up to 602.2 times higher than the optimal output target (i.e.
o = t =6 0 2 .2), q and Q are still very close to 1. Tables 4-6, in the appendix, conﬁrm these
results for other parameter values. In Table 2, below, constructed under the conditions of
Proposition 5(a), the economy is liquidity trapped in both states and there is a very high
level of persistence in the demand shocks.
Table 2: p = 1
50,y T = yS = ps,x = −(1 − p)s,ρ = 9
10


























































From Table 2, the social loss in the discretionary regime is, in some cases, twice that
under suboptimal delegation.
5.8. What happens if the Treasury does not have an inﬂation target?
Here we consider two alternative regimes. In both of these cases, the Central Bank is given
an inﬂation target πB, i.e., has the objective function given in (4.1) but the Treasury is not
g i v e na ni n ﬂation target. We ﬁn dt h a tt h e s er e g i m e sa r ea b l et oa c h i e v et h ep r e c o m m i t m e n t
solution.
The Treasury is an “output nutter”
If the Treasury is not given an inﬂation target, we call it an output nutter.I t s o b j e c t i v e










The Treasury is a “reckless output nutter”
27If the Treasury cares neither about inﬂation nor the costs of ﬁs c a lp o l i c yw ec a l li ta






We are interested in evaluating the performance of the alternative institutional regimes
in which the Treasury does not care about inﬂation. Proposition 7, below, shows that
the optimal precommitment solution can be achieved; the proof is identical to that of
Proposition 3 and, so, is omitted.
Proposition 7 : Unless the economy is liquidity trapped in both states of the world,
if the Treasury can be assigned an optimal output target y∗
T and the Central Bank is
assigned an optimal inﬂation target, π∗
B, then the outcome in the “output nutter” and the
“reckless output nutter” cases is identical to the precommitment regime.
However, and unlike the suboptimal delegation regime, if the Treasury does not adopt
the optimal output target, y∗
T, then the outcome can be very poor, and much worse than
the outcome under discretion. Table 3 gives a sample of results for the “output nutter”
case.
Table 3: Treasury is an “output nutter” (p = 1
50,y T = yS = s 6= y∗
T,x=0 )

















































In this case, Q can take extreme negative values i.e. the output nutter regime turns
out to be much worse than discretion; we summarize this result in the Proposition below.
Proposition 8 : If the Treasury is not assigned the optimal output target, y∗
T,t h e nt h e
performance of the “output nutter” and the “reckless output nutter” regimes can be very
adverse and, possibly, much worse than the discretionary regime. In particular, if monetary
policy is delegated to an independent central bank, with an optimal inﬂation target, while
the Treasury retains discretion over ﬁscal policy, then the outcome can be poor and much
worse than had the Treasury retained discretion over both monetary and ﬁscal policy.
Proposition 8 indicates the serious consequences that can arise if the Treasury/ govern-
ment does not have the appropriate inﬂation or output targets even if it follows society’s
most preferred output target (note yT = yS in Table 3). This has relevance for under-
standing the Japanese experience in which the ﬁscal authorities, as pointed out earlier,
were not delegated with the optimally designed targets.
285.9. Summary
Proposition 5 and Corollary 2 establish that the optimal delegation regime (where the Bank
has an optimal inﬂation target and the Treasury has optimal output and inﬂation targets)
achieves the precommitment solution for all parameter values. Proposition 6 shows that
performance of the suboptimal delegation regime (similar to the optimal delegation regime,
except that the Treasury has its own output target) is near optimal, and much better
than discretion, even when the Treasury deviates considerably from the optimal output
target. Proposition 7 establishes that the output nutter and the reckless output nutter
(in both cases the Bank and Treasury are given optimal inﬂation and output targets,
respectively, but the Treasury is not given an inﬂation target) regimes also achieve the
precommitment solution. However, Proposition 8 shows that the latter two regimes, unlike
the suboptimal delegation regime, perform poorly, and can be much worse than discretion,i f
the Treasury deviates from the optimal output target. Thus, although giving the Treasury
an inﬂation target as well as an output target is not necessary for optimality, it is necessary
to achieve robustness. In particular, a hybrid system, where monetary policy is delegated
to an independent central bank with an inﬂation target, but where the Treasury retains
discretion over ﬁscal policy, can perform poorly and much worse than had the Treasury
retained discretion over both monetary and ﬁscal policy.
6. Conclusions
In a liquidity trap, with nominal interest rates bound below by zero, an expectation of
positive inﬂation is needed. This in turn needs a credible commitment to a future level of
positive actual inﬂation. The credibility problem comes about because after the economy
has escaped from the liquidity trap it is in the interest of all parties to renegotiate and
reduce inﬂation. A forward looking private sector will anticipate this and expect low
future inﬂation. With low expected future inﬂation, the real interest rate remains positive,
keeping the economy in the liquidity trap; see for instance Krugman (1998).
The ﬁrst best solution obtains when the rigidities that give rise to the liquidity trap
are removed. But removal of these distortions is usually slow and diﬃcult (witness the
experience of Japan). In this case, macroeconomic policy can have an important role.
Furthermore, the Japanese experience suggests that issues of strategic monetary ﬁscal
policy interaction assume even greater importance in a liquidity trap.
In the solution considered here, society delegates monetary policy to an operationally
independent Central Bank with an inﬂation target. Fiscal policy is delegated to the Trea-
sury with inﬂation and output targets. Furthermore, the Treasury acts as a leader and the
Central Bank is the follower. The required institutional arrangements are quite natural
29and are able to achieve the second best solution, namely, the best rational expectations
precommitment solution. This institutional setting provides (1) the appropriate level of
inﬂa t i o na n d ,h e n c e ,i n ﬂation expectations and (2) the optimal balance between monetary
and ﬁscal policy. Even if the Treasury deviates considerably from the optimal output tar-
get, we ﬁnd that the performance of this solution is still ‘near optimal’ and much better
than the regime where the Treasury is given discretion over monetary and ﬁscal policy.
On the other hand, we ﬁnd that the hybrid system where monetary policy is delegated
to an independent central bank with an optimal inﬂation target, but where the Treasury
retains discretion over ﬁscal policy, can perform badly and much worse than had the
Treasury retained discretion over both ﬁscal and monetary policy. This is in line with the
case when there is no liquidity trap considered by Dixit and Lambertini (2003, p1523, point
4): “Commitment achieves the second best only if it can be extended to both monetary
and ﬁscal policy”.
7. Appendix
Generic Equilibrium: To save space, we carry out some calculations that are relevant
to both Proposition 1 (Precommitment) and Proposition 2 (Discretion).
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2 (7.1)
Since f ≷ 0 and i ≥ 0 the ﬁrst order conditions are as follows.
∂U
∂f
= yS − 2  − 4f − 3π
e +2 i =0 ; f ≷ 0 (7.2)
∂US
∂i
=2 f − 2i +3 π




Since f is unrestricted, the optimal f satisﬁes ∂U















Recall that values in the liquidity trap are distinguished by a ‘-’ subscript and those in the
complementary case by the ‘+’ subscript. From (7.3), either i ≥ 0 and
∂US
∂i =0or i =0
and
∂UF
∂i < 0, hence














yS + a ≥ 0 (7.5)







yS − a<0 (7.6)








yS + a and 3π
e − yS +2 a ≥ 0 (7.7)
i− =0and 3π
e − yS − 2a< 0 (7.8)




























a (liquidity trapped) (7.12)
This completes the description of the generic equilibrium. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1 (Precommitment)
Since the two possible values of   = −a and   = a are equally probable, using (7.1) the
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i+ ≥ 0, i− ≥ 0
Solving the ﬁrst order conditions simultaneously, using the condition of rational expecta-
tions (7.14) and the equations for output and inﬂation in (2.4) and (2.5), one obtains the
31solution for the policy variables and the macroeconomic magnitudes reported in Proposi-
tion 1. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2 (Discretion: Economy is liquidity trapped only under
adverse demand conditions,   = −a)
Since   = −a and   = a,e a c ho c c u rw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1
2, the condition for rational



























Hence the ﬁxed point of πe is readily found as
π
e =3 yS − 2a (7.15)
(7.7), (7.8)and (7.15) give
1
2
a ≤ yS <a (7.16)
which is the necessary and suﬃcient condition for this case to arise.
Substituting (7.15) in (7.7)-(7.10) gives the magnitudes of the policy instruments:
i− =0 (7.17)
f− =2( a − yS) > 0 (7.18)
i+ =4 yS − 2a (7.19)
f+ =0 (7.20)
The magnitudes of output and inﬂation can now be found from (2.4), (2.5), (7.15), and
(7.17)-(7.20):
y− = yS − a<0 (7.21)
π− =4 yS − 3a (7.22)
y+ = a − yS > 0 (7.23)
π+ =2 yS − a (7.24)
The expected values (where expectations are taken over the demand shock  )o fi, f and
y are given by
i
e =2 yS − a
f
e = a − yS > 0
y
e =0
Hence, on average macroeconomic policy ensures that there are no deviations of output
from the natural level (ye =0 ). To ﬁnd the state-contingent levels of social welfare,
32substitute (7.18), (7.20), (7.21)-(7.24) into (2.6) then take expectations over the demand











This completes the proof of the proposition. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3 (Solution under the optimal delegation regime)
Monetary authority’s reaction function
The monetary authority’s reaction function can be found by maximizing UB in (4.1).
Since i ≥ 0,t h eﬁrst order conditions for maximizing UB are
∂UB
∂i ≤ 0, i ≥ 0, i
∂UB
∂i =0 .
Using (2.5), this gives
i(f − i +2 π
e − πB +  ) ≤ 0 (7.26)
We start with the case where the economy is liquidity trapped in the the bad state (  = −a)
only. The other cases will be considered at the end.
The economy is in a liquidity trap (  = −a)
In this case, at   = −a the interest rate can go no lower than zero. Using (7.26),
f− +2 πe − πB − a<0,a n ds o
i− =0 (7.27)
The economy is not in a liquidity trap (  = a)
In this case, i ≥ 0, hence (7.26) holds with equality. Solving out for i at   = a,g i v e s
i+ = f+ +2 π
e − πB + a (7.28)
The state contingent reaction function of the monetary authority is given by (7.27) and
(7.28).
Fiscal authority’s reaction function
T h eT r e a s u r yn o wc h o o s e si t ss t a t ec o n t i n g e n tﬁscal policy f to maximize the objective
function (4.2) after observing πe and   and knowing that the state contingent reaction
function of the monetary authority is given by (7.27) and (7.28).
Case-I: Liquidity trap (  = −a)
In this case, the subsequent monetary policy is i− =0 , hence, using (2.4), (2.5), (4.2)

































33Case-II: No liquidity trap (  = a)
The subsequent monetary policy is given by (7.28), hence, using (2.4), (2.5), (4.2) and













T with respect to f+ gives
f+ =0 (7.32)
The state contingent reaction function of the ﬁscal authority is given by (7.30) and (7.32)
respectively.
Substituting the state contingent monetary and ﬁscal policy reaction functions in (2.4)





























y+ = πB − π
e (7.35)
π+ = πB (7.36)
Calculation of expected inﬂation
Since the two states of the world are equally probable, πe is simply a weighted average












Substituting πe in (7.28), (7.30), (7.33)-(7.35), one obtains









































Calculation of the optimal inﬂation target
34Substituting (7.32), (7.36), (7.38), (7.39) (7.40), (7.42) in (4.2) the expected social



































in (7.43) with respect to πB and yT gives the following optimal













Substituting (7.44) and (7.45) in (4.2) gives the ﬁnal expression for expected social welfare

















Comparing with Proposition 1, we see that the inﬂation and output targets achieve
the optimal solution, with the economy liquidity trapped in the bad state only. Hence,
the two other cases, when the economy is never liquidity trapped and when the economy
is liquidity trapped in both states, need not be considered; thus the proof is complete. ¥
7.1. Appendix- B: The discretionary regime in the general case






(αϕ2 − µλγ)(α + βµ2)sp
γµ2 + ϕ2 (α + βµ2)
¶
then the economy is liquidity trapped in both states and the solution under discretion is
given by i− = i+ =0
f− = ϕ
µ
(α + βµ2)s(1 − p)

























(αϕ2 − γλµ)(α + βµ2)sp
γµ2 + ϕ2 (α + βµ2)
¶
then the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state only and the solution under discre-
tion is given by i− = f+ =0
f− = ϕ
(α + βµ2)βλµyS +( α + βµ2)αρx − αs(α + µ2β)(1− p)
(αµ + λ(α + βµ2))γµp− α(γµ2 + ϕ2 (α + βµ2))
> 0
35i+ =
−(αρx + βλµyS)(γµ2 + ϕ2 (α + βµ2)) + (α + µ2β)(γλµ− αϕ2)sp
λ((γλµp− αϕ2)(α + βµ2) − γµ2α(1 − p))
≥ 0.
(c) If x ≥
αs(1−p)−λβµyS
αρ then the economy is liquidity trapped in neither state and the
solution under discretion is given by f− = f+ =0 ,
i− =




αρx + αsp + βλµyS
αλ
>i − ≥ 0
7.2. Appendix-C: Further simulation results
Tables 4, 5, 6 report the most interesting case: the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad
state only.
Table 4 below conﬁrms results similar to those in Table 1 when the probability of falling
into the liquidity trap is very remote i.e. p = 1
50.
Table 4: p = 1
50,y T = yS = s,x =0

































































































10 0.9984 1.902 0.9983 60.224 1.825s
In Table 4, even if the output target of the Treasury, yT, is 5158.2 times that of
the optimal output target, y∗
T, results R1 and R2 above still hold. Tables 5, 6 below
conﬁrm the two main results, R1 and R2, for much smaller output targets of the Treasury
yT = yS = ps when the probability of falling into the liquidity trap takes a high and a low
value respectively.
Table 5: p = 1
2,y T = yS = ps,x =0





















































































10 0.9985 1.17 0.9913 1.42 0.41s
36Table 6: p = 1
50,y T = yS = ps,x =0





















































































10 1.0 1.008 0.9999 1.205 1.992s
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